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Abstract 
 
   The coastal Queensland regions are heavily dependent upon the sugar 
industry and are likely to remain so.  The interplay between sugar industry and 
regional development is little understood beyond the historical record.  Yet 
current reform proposals place great store on regional initiatives to rejuvenate 
both sugar and its host communities.  Such proposals are at best naïve as will 
be seen in this paper.   
   A key feature of sugar and like industries is a high degree of supply chain 
interdependence which is embedded in place and time.  Reflecting this, sugar 
regions have a more diverse skills mix and a more advanced manufacturing 
and services capability than many other agriculturally-oriented regions, 
notably broadacre grain and beef.   
   Central to the emergence of such a regional industrial structure are inter-
industry transactions.  These will be considered in both an input-output 
framework and from a transactions cost basis.  Associated insights point to the 
inadequacy and likely failure of initiatives based on current 
“efficiency/productivity” thinking.  Alternative ways to view the industry are 
discussed along with a recommendation that those involved with sugar 
regionally revisit current plans. 
------ 
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Sugar supply chains and regional development 
 
Relationships between those in sugar supply chains and some implications for regional 
development are explored in this paper which is in five main parts: 
1 Transactions cost economics is reviewed 
2 Perceptions on an economy are conceptually explored 
3 Relations between supply chains and transactions costs are considered 
4 Representations of sugar, transactions and supply chains are advanced 
5 Some implications are briefly drawn 
It will be seen that the use of limited perceptions on transactions is encouraging 
somewhat foolhardy thinking and flawed policy prescriptions with implications not 
only for those in sugar but also for the regions which host the transactions.  
  
1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 
TCE pertains to the co-existence of different forms of organizations and mechanisms 
for co-ordinating economic transactions: firms, markets, and hybrid forms of 
governance of exchange relations. It ‘emerged as a reaction to the neoclassical theory 
of the firm which ignored the friction inherent in transactions’ (Wilson, 1996). The 
seminal work of Coase (1937) identified this limitation of the neoclassical paradigm. 
 
Williamson (1985, 1991) has since developed Coase’s original insights to draw 
together the core concepts of “transaction cost” in TCE. Williamson reasoned that 
bounded rationality and opportunism are characteristic of human behavior and, when 
incorporated with informational asymmetry and asset specificity, result in transactions 
costs. Wilson (1996) referring to Cheung (1992), classifies these dimensions as ‘a 
spectrum of institutional costs’ including those of information, negotiation, and 
monitoring (enforcement) costs. 
 
Loader (1997, p. 25) adds that Williamson (1979) further distinguishes between: 
 ‘Frequency’ (volume/number of transactions per time period) as the ‘cost-
determining attributes of individual transactions’, and  
 ‘Uncertainty’ as the ‘environmental, political, social or economic risk’ related to 
transactions. 
These additional characteristics lead to costs in carrying out transactions. 
 
The human characteristics encompass all informational activities that influence 
transaction costs within a supply network and on the efficiency (minimization of 
transaction costs) of alternative transaction modes. Therefore, simply stated, 
transaction costs are the costs of gathering information prior to a transaction, 
negotiating the actions of carrying out the exchange, and monitoring enforcement to 
ensure that pre-arranged terms of the transaction are adhered to (Boger, Hobbs & Kerr, 
2001). Coase (1937) opines that these costs are an incentive to integration, either 
through cooperation or by buyout of chain partners. 
 
Further, Boger, Hobbs & Kerr (2001) state that prohibitively high transaction costs 
will stifle economic exchange, deter investment and impede the transition process. 
Transaction costs are, therefore, considered as one of the main motives for interaction, 
co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration to alleviate the uncertainty of the market, 
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reduce risks, and to increase the efficiency of economic exchange. Heide (1994) also 
emphasized the need ‘for establishing and managing channel relationships’ especially 
where mutual dependence of firms involved in transactions is acknowledged. Mentzer 
(1993) states that ‘from a channel relationship perspective, the long term relational 
orientation and the limited supplier decisions tend to make the channels more 
strategically oriented and relationships more cooperative than conflictual’(p. 32). 
 
In the objective to achieve reduced transaction costs, Wilson (1996) also endorses the 
establishment of ‘a lasting relationship based on trust’ among players to ‘ “synergize 
their strengths” to improve the supply and development of the market’ (p. 29). This 
precludes the need for contracts and expensive negotiation. Batt (2003), while citing 
Hawes, Mart, and Swan (1989), states that ‘for any particular potential exchange, trust 
will be critical if two situational factors are present: risk and incomplete buyer 
information’ (p.66).  
 
In addition to trust for the establishment of successful long-term relationships, 
commitment is also recognized as an essential ingredient (Gundlach, Achrol, Mentzer, 
1995). They further write that: 
Committed partners are willing to invest in valuable assets specific to an 
exchange, demonstrating that they can be relied upon to perform essential 
functions in the future (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). These self-interest stakes help 
stabilize associations, alleviating the uncertainty and cost of continually seeking 
and consummating new exchanges (p.78).  
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) drawing on The Commitment-Trust Theory mention that 
‘when both commitment and trust – not just one or the other – are present, they 
produce outcomes that promote efficiency, productivity and effectiveness’ (p.22).  
 
Therefore, if reducing transaction costs is the objective of an economic arrangement, 
this can be achieved by building long-term ‘channel relationships’ based on trust and 
commitment. Transparency and openness among the chain members helps lessen the 
appeal of essentially short-term alternatives in favor of the long-term benefits, and 
reduce uncertainty.  Such conditions of cooperative behaviors will result in awareness, 
trust, efficiency, transparency and rewards.  The basis is internal choices informed by a 
more complete understanding of the implications of transaction alternatives in both the 
short and long run.  
2 Perceptions on an economy 
 
Markets and networks provide alternative models of economic activity.  In a market 
participants exchange items.    In a network participants are specifically linked (or not).  
The focus in the former is on the exchange, in the latter on the linkage.  Of course, a 
linkage may pave the way for various exchanges and similarly an exchange provides 
an at-least momentary linkage.  Common to both are transactions, but they are viewed 
in markedly different ways.  
 
Consider as a practical example the Australian sugar industry.  This can be conceived 
as “a market for sugar” with the “sugar” commodity exchanged between two sets of 
parties.  The industry can also be conceived as a series of markets for the various 
products (such as fertiliser, cane, mill sugar, raw sugar, refined sugar) that are involved 
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in various exchanges originating with cane sugar.  In economic analysis, the former 
would typically be approached by neoclassical analysis of a market (containing many 
entities associated with a single product, and an emphasis on price and quantity in 
transactions) with a general equilibrium approach of adjusting prices adopted for the 
latter (which is of many markets, each containing many entities).  Such an approach 
has been widely adopted for sugar (as can be found in Industry Commission 1992; CIE 
2002 for example).  Other views might be adopted (McGovern 2003).  For example, a 
set of durable production entities (farms, mills, harvester groups and the like) can be 
assumed as focal.  These might be sectors in an input-output transactions table, stages 
in a supply chain or nodes in a network.  A typical analytic challenge is to describe and 
understand transactions between the entities as they are generated and governed by 
significant entities that exist and persist.  This view is, arguably, appropriate when 
stress is present, industry situations are to be addressed, interdependencies are high or 
transactions are managed.    
 
Distinctly different points of focus are involved.  A neoclassical equilibrium view 
(essentially aggregative, a priori and ex post) is of a market within which exchange 
between largely inconsequential entities occurs.  Alternately the view is of a 
consequential  entity by which production occurs (essentially distributed, ex ante and a 
posteriori).  Each view is built on an initial perception (and associated assumptions) of 
existing participants and of the transactions between them.   
 
Each participant will be an economic entity in its own right, but markedly different 
entity and transaction aspects are focal.  For purposes of illustration consider the 
circles in Figure 1 as potential participants.  Neoclassically these would be markets (or 
market participants) with product quantity and price in determined transactions of 
interest.  Alternatively these can be production centres, with various attributes of 
associated transactions being of interest.  Behavioural and other attributes which can 
only be assumed in neoclassical economics can be more richly addressed using TCE.    
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Figure  1.  A group of potential participants 
 
 
Such participants are then to be made somehow made part of the economy.  One 
possibility is to specifically link participants.  This is shown by the rectangles fully 
linking between the circles in Figure 2a.   The network so formed is an explicit 
articulation of “collected” interactions.  A second possibility is to group all 
participants.  Such an approach creates an overarching or encompassing entity, shown 
as the larger darker rectangle in Figure 2b.  A third possibility is to allow open linkage 
areas to which many participants may associate in some suitable way.  This is 
essentially the accessible area view, with such areas shown as squares potentially 
linking between the circles as in Figure 2c. 
Figure 2.  Linking the participants 
a.  by particularised links b. in a group       c. by areas of open association 
     
 
Each picture is distinctive.  Each can be used to illustrate possibilities and distinctive 
features of the three modes of association.1  Structure is emphasised in the first picture, 
inclusion in the second and various possible associations in the third.  While some 
participants are “fully linked in” the first (and others are not), all are “in” the second 
(with none out) and each “may be linked in” the third depending on how the remaining 
distance is to be spanned.  While the first is not inclusive it is perfected in terms of 
fully completing all spaces between selected participants. The second is fully inclusive 
(and so perfect in this way) but is not at all completed as to how specific links might be 
built.  The third is imperfect both in term of inclusion and linking.   
 
Such are some of the general types of description that can be applied to an economy.  
Four definitions are involved in the particular description above: 
• Entity, a demarcated and separable region of economic activity. 
                                                 
1  While various algebraic representations can also be built from such a basis, this will not be undertaken here.  Nor 
will detailed investigations of immediate applicability and the like be undertaken: Figure 2b provides a basis 
formulation of the perfectly competitive market for example. Rather various pictorial developments will be used to 
explore possible combinations and implications in a general way.  
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• Link, a pathway for associating entities in a pairwise fashion. 
• Group, a collection of entities or other contained things. 
• Market, a somehow accessible area within which exchange occurs. 
 
Any one of these may form a foundation upon which to build a world view.  In the 
above we defined the entities and then asked how they might be linked.  Alternatives 
would be to choose links, groups or market areas as “the” foundation and then ask how 
entities or other non-foundation members might relate.  Various world views can thus 
be constructed by building from distinctive foundations.  Such views are orthogonal in 
that they are directed from somewhat exclusionary starting points.  Yet transactions 
would be seen to be a common component.  Such an assumption overlooks how what 
is presumed to be “the same” transaction may be differently specified or actualised, or 
need to be, in different contexts. 
 
3 Supply Chain and Transaction Costs  
 
Supply chain management (SCM) focuses on interdependent economic entities 
transacting along a supply chain.  It is built on a foundation of trust and commitment 
(Lee and Billington, 1992). In contrast to the atomistic competition in a competitive 
market, SCM is seen in its basic form as a move towards co-operation in building a 
long-term relationship. ‘These long-term relationship lead to reduced political social or 
economic risk, reduced transaction costs, and access to economies of scale by by-
passing traditional market arrangements’ (Loader, 1997; p.22). 
 
Consider the transaction cost basis.  McAdam and McCormack (2001) highlight that as 
supply chains develop, complexity increases with: 
 Increase in the number of linkages to be managed; 
 Difficulty in the communication of a common goals; and 
 Increase dependency on each other among the chain members. 
 
Echoing similar concerns, Loader (1997) referring to Hakansson (1982) notes that 
‘exchange relations are not always co-operative, and therefore the notion of 
rationalizing and economizing on transaction costs in the comparison of the different 
modes of organization becomes crucial’ (p.25).  
 
Following Williamson (1985), an efficient alignment of the governance mode and the 
characteristics of the transactions are expected to exist. In the context of the above, it is 
imperative to understand both the contracting process and governance. 
 
The contracting process and the world it creates can be considered in the words of 
Williamson (1985, p. 30):  
The world of contract is variously described as one of (1) planning, (2) 
promise, (3) competition, and (4) governance (or private ordering). Which of 
these descriptions is most applicable depends on the behavioral assumptions 
that pertain to an exchange and on the economic attributes of the good or 
service in question.  
 
The key concepts of TCE that underpin the contracting process are uncertainty, 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity. 
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(i) ‘Uncertainty’ in various degrees is present in any economic exchange. This 
contributes to costs in carrying out transactions.  
(ii) ‘Bounded rationality’ acknowledge limited judgements of individuals. This 
means that though the individuals may try to act rationally, they may be by 
partially successful in realizing their intentions.  
(iii) ‘Opportunism’ is defined by Williamson (1985, p. 47) as ‘self-interest seeking 
with guile’. This recognizes individuals to behave opportunistically to exploit a 
situation to their own advantage.  
(iv) ‘Asset specificity’ signifies investment characteristics and denotes dedicated 
inputs. 
 
Williamson (1985) writes that the ‘most critical dimension for describing transactions 
is the condition of asset specificity’. Lyons (1994) while stating that ‘modern 
transaction cost theory is predicted on two key behavioral assumptions, opportunism 
and bounded rationality’, maintains that the transaction cost theory ‘is made 
operational by the central role given to asset specificity’ (p.314). 
 
These characteristics also have a major influence on the efficiency of alternative 
transaction modes.  Based upon  the above dimensions, the variances in the contract 
process can be considered as  presented in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1.   Attributes of the Contracting Process 
 
 Behavioral Assumption      Implied Contracting 
________________________________     Process 
   Bounded      Opportunism  Asset 
   Rationality     Specificity 
 
 0   +       +   Rational & cognitive  
planning – taking an 
educated account of 
all relevant issues & 
potential problems. 
 
 +   0       +   Promise – based on  
complete trust &
    honesty of 
parties     leading to 
self-   
enforcement for 
mutual benefit. 
 
 +   +       0   Competition – in the 
market will 
overcome 
         problems 
 
 +   +       +   Governance –  
         internalization of  
         contracting 
 
Notes: + denotes presence in significant degree; 0 denotes absence 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1985) and Loader (1997). 
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The table suggests the following implications: 
(1) When a situation arise where bounded rationality is absent, that is, full rational 
judgment is assumed with dedicated inputs and opportunistic parties, then the 
contractual process becomes one of rational and cognitive planning. In such 
situation, contract between parties is accurate and effective and based on full and 
informed account of all possibilities.When opportunism is absent, and parties need 
to base their judgements on limited information with assets dedicated to the 
specific transaction, then the contracting process is based on promise that is a result 
of trust between them and makes the contract self enforcing. 
(2) When asset specificity is absent, that is, the input can be freely selected with 
opportunistic self-interest and limited judgement being present, then the 
contracting process is in the realm of competition where the market decides.  In 
this situation neither parties are interested about each other or on establishing any 
relationship. 
(3) This is a situation where conditions of limited judgement, opportunistic self-
interest, and dedicated inputs are present at the same time. In a case like this 
rational and cognitive planning is not effective, promise does not hold, and 
competition does not persist due to dedicated inputs. This results in internalization 
of the contract process where internal governance holds. 
 
Governance can be achieved in various ways and with varying emphasis on effective 
influences.  Transactions may be assumed as somehow coherent in their own right. 
They may also be seen as externally or internally influenced.  Governance needs and 
preferred contract arrangements will vary with the situation.  
 
TCE acknowledges that the variety in the contractual process is mainly explained by 
underlying differences in the attributes of transactions and ‘that each generic form of 
governance…needs to be supported by a different form of contract law’ (Williamson, 
1991; p. 271).  
 
There are three main types of contract: classical, neoclassical, and relational. 
 
 Classical Contract: Classical contract law endeavors to implement discreteness 
and applies to the ideal transaction in law and economics…in which the identity of 
the parties is irrelevant. Classical contract law is congruent with and supports the 
autonomous market form of organization. The emphasis is on legal rules, formal 
documents, and self-liquidating transactions (Williamson 1985, p. 69; Williamson 
1991, p. 271). 
 
 Neoclassical Contract: Neoclassical contract law, which relieves parties from 
strict enforcement, applies to contracts in which the parties to the transaction 
maintain autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree. A 
recognition that the world is complex, the agreements are incomplete, and the some 
contracts will never be reached unless both parties have confidence in the 
settlement machinery thus characterizes neoclassical contract law (Williamson 
1985, p. 70; Williamson 1991; pp. 271-272). 
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 Relational Contract: ‘Continuing contract between the parties where a range of 
social and economic relationships help to define and support a range of 
transactions’ (Loader, 1997, p. 26).  
 
To successfully accomplish transactions, appropriate governance is needed.  The 
structure for efficient governance in regard to the volume and recurrence of 
transactions and investment characteristics is depicted in Table 2. It is seen that 
standardized nature of transaction stems from classical contracting and implies market 
governance. In this, the alternatives to opportunistic self-interest behavior are available 
from the market. 
 
Different arrangements are evident: 
• Trilateral governance (middle row in Table 2) implies that contracts stipulate 
arbitration as the settlement mechanism in case of disputes and also employs 
performance evaluation. 
 
• Continuing contractual contract is the characteristic of the bilateral governance 
with the autonomy of the parties maintained.   
 
• Unified governance implies unification of some sort and in some way(s), with 
internalization of the contracting process.  
 
Table 2. Efficient governance structure based on principal dimensions of transactions  
Nature of 
transaction 
Frequency Asset 
Specificity 
Type of 
Contracting 
Expected 
governance 
structure   
Standardized 
 
Occasional 
and Recurring 
Non-Specific Classical Marketa 
 
Non- 
Standardized 
Occasional Mixed and 
highly specific 
Neo-Classical Trilateralb 
Non- 
Standardized 
Recurring Mixed and 
highly specific 
Relational Bilateralc/ 
Unifiedd 
Notes: 
a Alternatives are available (from the market) which can be used if dishonesty persists 
and  protect each party against opportunism by his opposite. 
b  Contracts are built with safeguards and third-party assistance (arbitration) in 
resolving disputes and evaluating performance is employed. 
c  Bilateral governance implies continuing contractual contract, but with the autonomy 
of the parties maintained. 
d   Unified governance implies internalization of the contracting process. 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1985) and Loader (1997). 
 
Four distinct governance structures are delineated.  Their appropriateness depends on 
the situation.  Situations should properly be analysed if governance choice is to be apt. 
 
4.  Transaction Cost, Sugar and the Supply Chain 
 
The factors that make for an integrated approach as applicable in the food supply 
chains involve complex issues such as perishability, transportation of low value 
products, and increasing consumer demands for safety (Hobbs, 1996; Folkerts and 
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Koehorst, 1997). This is also applicable in the sugar industry. The chain can achieve 
integration through joint strategic planning by all participants working together 
through open and transparent sharing of information based on mutual trust and respect.  
 
In search of efficiencies in the Australian sugar industry, Muchow (2000) has referred 
to ‘exploiting linkages and interdependencies across the farming, milling, and 
marketing sectors’ with the ‘shared ownership of local issues’ and ‘a commitment to 
proceed on a partnership basis’. He has further stressed on the fact that integration of 
the growing, harvesting and transport, and milling sectors is complex, but essential, to 
assess the benefits and costs of different cane supply scenarios. 
 
Milford (2002) observes that there has been recognition in the sugar industry of 
Australia, almost since the inception, for the need for some form of chain management. 
This is primarily ‘due to the highly integrated nature of the chain and the potential for 
adverse power relationships within it’. He further notes that, in Australia, 
 
the sugar industry supply chain has been managed in the past through 
legislation. …This mediated the power relationships, obviated the need to 
develop other forms of relationship and led to the establishment of strong 
sectoral representative bodies and linkages (pp. i &2). 
How might such things be presented in terms of the earlier perceptual models?  The 
illustration provided in Figure 3 highlights a number of things including: 
• The presence of multiple entities 
• The pattern of flows emanating from FARM 
• The existence of two distinct markets reflecting two distinct product groups  
• That MILL operates across the interface between two markets 
• The existence of several places of potential interconnection for consumers be 
they domestic or overseas. 
• The coexistence of markets and networks with entities interacting with these in 
unspecified ways. 
A broad context is thus depicted within which things such as power and relationships 
play out.   
 
The diagonal FARM-MILL link is a focal arena for much discussion and dispute.  
Given the non standardised nature of transactions and that they are occasional in the 
sense of being event-affected, and also given the mixed and highly specific assets 
involved, a trilateral governance structure might be expected (as detailed in Table 2).  
Which of the circular entities might provide the third party arbitrator and advance a 
neoclassical contract environment?  Also is the mooted involvement of regional 
coordinating groups not a shift towards relational contracting.  While this may be 
appropriate for those things that are recurring, the need for a third party is not at all 
established if the arguments behind Table 2 are accepted. 
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Figure 3.   A particular (planar) perception on cane-sugar flows 
 
 
Interpretation of such an illustration is aided by the use of words.  These can name and 
group the various parts.  They can also aid focus and lend emphasis.  Such things 
enable an ordering of what would otherwise be unintelligible.  Such specification does 
embed bias, however.  Imputation by the observer is also important, a reader inferring 
such things at the direction of flow from earlier discussions.  Interpretations by 
“unprepared” readers may vary.  
 
A particular interpretation of combinations of entities, links, markets and groups is 
present in any such illustration.  The markets involve groups and links are of two 
types, for example.  There is no indication of any entity differentiation with respect to 
market or link interactions.  The MILL entity has two of each with which to interact.  
Typically we would just assume that the interactions occur appropriately.  In reality 
there are likely to be conflicts with stress on the entity and strain within it.        
 
Such a representation can be also seen as a special case of a more general form.  Only 
one facet for each of entity, link, market and group are shown.  If more than one facet 
is shown (as in Figure 4) a more complex set of possibilities are apparent.  A much 
richer variety of interpretations are now possible.  Depth is introduced, and with it 
many possibilities that would be otherwise overlooked.  Simplicity is lost, however.  
Analysts will need to choose as to the balance between such richness and simplicity.    
Food products 
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Intermediate and final domestic consumers 
O
v
e
r
s
e
a
s
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
s 
 12
Figure  4.  An alternative “richer” perception, showing more than one facet for 
each element  
 
 
 
The three “red” bars from the FARM “cylinder” can be variously interpreted, typically 
as the input and output flows to the sector.  The FARM-MILL link is singled out on 
the diagonal as previously.  All manner of interactions are involved in developing this 
aggregated transaction which can be considered and analysed in various ways.  An 
interesting visual approach is to segment the FARM sector but not the MILL, 
reflecting the actual compositions of sectors in any region.  Should the link also be 
segmented, and if so how?  Also if a single farm is assumed to be somewhere at the top 
of the FARM sector cylinder, while it might have a view of MILL it need not have a 
view of other farms lower down the cylinder.   Such developments highlight more of 
the detailed nature of the situation, and also the limitations of assumptions sometimes 
put such as each farm being able to negotiate with MILL.  A criticism, then, of much 
current sugar thinking is that it lacks depth.  
 
Consider now transaction costs as arising in the cane sugar industry.  This is a 
common focus of those in the industry with a usual goal of cost reduction and 
sometimes minimization.  In an attempt to reduce transaction costs Milford (2002), 
referring to Chapman, Milford, and Burrows (1997), provides some examples of 
transaction costs in the sugar industry. They include: 
 The costs of miller-grower negotiations; that is preparation, meetings, grower 
feedback meetings, expert assistance, mediation and arbitration, technical and 
negotiation support; 
 The costs of compliance with industry regulations; e.g. applying for cane 
production area; 
 The costs that arise because of asymmetric information; that is seeking information 
known to the other side, mistakes made due to lack of knowledge; 
FARM  MILL 
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 The cost of entering into a harvesting arrangement and uncertainty arising due to 
any change in the arrangements. 
How would such things be built into Figure 4, or in some like representation? 
 
Reflecting on Section 2, a starting point is the chosen entities and their transaction 
attributes.  There are a wide range of conditions that enable and then determine the 
“success” of a transaction (including its ultimately revealed cost).  Not only should 
aspect such as those in the previous paragraph be explicitly incorporated, leading to 
comprehensive economic cost accounting instead of current nominal costing.  Also 
governance issues need addressing, with the locale of decision making being explicitly 
considered on strong economic grounds.  Specifically reflecting Table 2, would 
unified, market, bilateral or trilateral governance be appropriate?  In terms of Figure 4, 
should decision making about cane supply to mill, say, be made in a MILL cylinder, in 
each FARM cylinder, across all FARM cylinders, or in an outside cylinder (external 
party, in the region or beyond?).  Also, where should regimes permeate: which 
cylinders, bars or planes, and how?  Additionally, what costs and risks attend each 
choice, and how might returns be distributed under different scenarios? 
 
The dominant position espoused by State and Federal agencies is one of market 
governance but there are clear grounds for alternatives in the arguments that have been 
presented.  At the very least it would seem appropriate in a multibillion dollar industry 
operating in a variety of market situations and circumstances to at least explicitly 
consider governance in some depth rather than assume an almost automatically 
beneficent market form.  A similar argument applies in any situation of marked 
interdependence, such as occurs in regional development.  Transactions need to be 
explicitly addressed if an enterprise is to become embedded in a region, and part of its 
development.  Enclave enterprises live on the fringe of the regional economy sourcing 
transactions elsewhere with few if any beneficial regional impacts.   
 
Alternatives to market governance may also be appropriate if transactions are to be 
effective and efficient.  The clear preference under National Competition Policy, for 
example, is to rely upon market governance but issues of “regional development” 
provide one of the eight allowable bases for alternative approaches.  Clearly a 
transactions based approach could be used to build a case that what we might term 
“standard competition” is inappropriate in specified situations of sectoral or enterprise 
interdependence, or regional intradependence.  Figure 4 might be cast as a services 
cluster, for example, one that may meet regional needs more adequately and in a less 
costly manner than external or competitive provision. 
 
Further, a common assumption is that activity reduction or interaction “simplification” 
in some area would reduce transactions costs.  Reducing the part is assumed to reduce 
the whole.  However such a position may overlook how parts of the interconnectedness 
affect global outcomes.  Just as cost minimization is not consistent with profit 
maximization (as demonstrated abstractly by neoclassical analysis and by common 
sense in the field), so also reducing elements of a transaction need not reduce overall 
transaction cost.   Such considerations complement those of the previous section. 
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5.  Implications 
 
Using neoclassical market models for transactions such as those in sugar is then 
essentially a misspecification.  Considerations of supply chains and of transactions 
costs can advance understanding further than an assumption of, or desire for, a 
competitive market.  Simply laying out the patterns of interactions, as in the simple 
Figures, can provide a way for illustrating some possibilities.  The importance and 
relevance of structures and positionings are revealed in an appropriate specification. 
 
The development presented here is essentially a preliminary one.  It shows some of the 
possibilities in working from alternative bases to those popularly proposed, most 
notably the abstracted commodity market.  Further development by extension from this 
basis has been developed, as is reported elsewhere.  The present focus is on analytical 
choices and the implications of choices made.  Such things appear to have had very 
little consideration by those in the Queensland cane sugar sectors or by those now 
advising the industry.  Diligent care and due comprehension are needed if the industry 
is not to be weakened further by inappropriate recommendations from mis-specified 
models and flawed analysis 
 
Sugar supply chains can be regarded in several ways, as indicated.  There are various 
ways in which the implications of transactions cost in sugar can be assessed.  Proper 
use of such concepts is recommended as a high priority.  This is so not only for those 
in the regions and industry but also at all levels of government.  This is a real challenge 
but it is one which will need to be met if sugar and its regions are to be successfully 
advanced.   
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